演講主題: Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
主 講 人: 姚加權，暨南大學管理學院教授
主 持 人: 鄧 洋，財務金融系講師
網絡直播平臺：騰訊會議，會議ID：140 290 984
姚加權，暨南大學金融學教授，博導。博士畢業于新加坡南洋理工大學，研究方向包括公司金融，信息經濟學，金融科技，文本分析和機器學習，論文發表于Review of Financial Studies，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Journal of Banking and Finance和《管理科學學報》等國內外權威期刊，以及計算機頂會WWW2018和KDD2020。
Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. principal-agent consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between parties staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world contracts cover increase after a drop in trust. The results hold for several text-analysis-based measures of completeness and do not arise when agents are also principals (shareholders) or in other falsification tests. Non-compete agreements, confidentiality and indemnification clauses, and restrictions to agents’ actions are more likely to be added to contracts signed in the same locations, same industries, and same years after a negative shock to trust.